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Interstate Commerce and Intrastate Endangered Species:
The Controversy and the Need for Compromise
“Destroying species is like tearing pages out of an unread book, written
in a language humans hardly know how to read, about the place where
they live.”
- Holmes Rolston III1
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fifty-eight year period from 1937 to 1995, the Supreme Court
declined to strike down a single Congressional Act promulgated under
the Commerce Clause.2 With this power, Congress accomplished many
essential and, indeed, long overdue goals such as the landmark Civil
Rights Act of 1964.3 Also important, Congress took advantage of the
Court’s highly deferential rational basis regime to pass the acclaimed
Endangered Species Act (hereinafter ESA).4
While the Court’s lenient rational basis standard gave Congress an
avenue it needed to bring about reform in some of the nation’s most
important issues, it concurrently raised questions regarding federalism.
Noting these concerns, one commentator observed that the “Commerce
Clause had become an intellectual joke among academics and attorneys”
because the provision no longer had enforceable limits.5 Perhaps coming
to the same conclusion, the Supreme Court, in its surprising and
sweeping 1995 United States v. Lopez6 decision, declared that the GunFree School Zones Act of 1990 (hereinafter GFSZA) exceeded the

1. Holmes Rolston, III, Duties to Endangered Species, 35 BIOSCIENCE 718, 718-726 n.11
(1985).
2. Bradford C. Mank, Comment, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species
Under the Commerce Clause? The Split in the Circuits Over Whether the Regulated Activity Is
Private Commercial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 92324 (Spring 2004).
3. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
4. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). One newspaper
article referred to the act as “widely hailed environmental legislation.” Christopher Getzan,
Controversial Attack on Endangered Species Act May Backfire, THE NEW STANDARD, July 12, 2005,
available at: http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=show_item&itemid=2078.
5. Deborah Jones Merritt, Reflections on United States v. Lopez: Commerce!, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 674, 691 (1995).
6. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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legislative power derived from the Commerce Clause.7
This landmark case involved a violation of GFSZA when a San
Antonio high school senior carried a concealed .38-caliber handgun to
school.8 In striking down the statute, Chief Justice Rehnquist quoted
James Madison’s Federalist No. 45. “The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.”9 Using Madison’s logic, Rehnquist continued, “[J]ust as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any
one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front.”10 This language clearly indicates that the Court felt
compelled to reign in congressional use of the Commerce Clause in order
to prevent federal abuse of power.
Operating under the premise that there are indeed limits on the scope
of the Commerce Clause, the Chief Justice articulated three categories
under which Congress could regulate using this power.11 First, Congress
could regulate “the use of the channels of interstate commerce, such as
using interstate transportation routes.”12 Next, the Commerce Clause
could be used for “[the] protect[ion] of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, such as
proscribing theft of goods destined for interstate shipment.”13 Finally,
Congress could use the power to involve itself in “intrastate activities
having a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”14 The majority made
it a point to state that the third category, dealing with intrastate activities,
“required a substantial effect, not just any effect.”15
The Court created a four-pronged analysis to determine whether an
intrastate issue amounted to a substantial effect on interstate commerce.16
The factors include 1) whether the statute is economic in nature; 2)
whether the statute has an express jurisdictional limit to its reach so it

7. Michael C. Blumm & George Kimbrell, Flies, Spiders, Wolves, and the Constitutionality
of the Endangered Species Act’s Take Provision, 34 ENVTL. L. 309, 317 (2004).
8. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
9. Id. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-293 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
10. Id.
11. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 7, at 318; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
12. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 7, at 318; see also Lopez. 514 U.S. at 558.
13. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 7, at 318; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
14. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 7, at 318; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
15. Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 7, at 318; see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59..
16. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
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only regulates activities that have a clear connection to interstate
commerce; 3) whether the statute has congressional findings linking the
substantial effect to interstate commerce; and 4) whether the statute’s
effect on interstate commerce is too attenuated.17
If there were any uncertainty remaining about the Court’s concern
regarding the overreaching of power from the federal government, it
eviscerated that doubt five years later in United States v. Morrison.18
Here, the Court invalidated the Violence Against Women Act
(hereinafter VAWA) of 199419 after two Virginia Tech football players,
accused of repeatedly raping a female student, challenged the
constitutionality of the act under the Commerce Clause.20 Once again,
Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed concern about Congress infringing on
the authority of the states and reiterated language in Lopez that if the
Commerce Clause had no judicially enforceable limits, Congress could
use this power to “obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government.”21
While addressing concerns with federalism, the Lopez and Morrison
precedents also have brought into question the constitutionality of some
federal environmental regulations. Section 9 of the ESA is particularly
susceptible to attack under the Court’s new Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.22 Congress has the power under Section 9 not only to
regulate the federal government’s actions, but also to create limits on
private property.23 Two relatively recent federal circuit decisions, issued
in 2003 and within a week of each other, highlight the tension between
the Lopez and Morrison holdings and Section 9. The two cases came out
of the Fifth and the District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeal
(hereinafter D.C. Circuit) respectively and each addressed the issue of
protecting purely intrastate, endangered, or threatened species from

17. Id. at 560-75. See also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000) (Chief
Justice Rehnquist subsequently paraphrased the four-prong limitation on the regulation of intrastate
activities).
18. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13931-14053 (2000). Congress stated its purpose and authority for enacting
VAWA in § 13981(a):
Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this subtitle under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution, it is the purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of
gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting
interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender.
20. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608.
21. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577-78).
22. See, e.g., Mank, supra note 2, at 941.
23. Id. at 925.
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development of private lands.24
In GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton25, (hereinafter GDF) the Fifth
Circuit held that even though intrastate spiders and beetles have no
inherent economic impact, harming species does have a substantial
impact on interstate commerce if aggregated.26 The D.C Circuit, in
contrast, rejected this line of reasoning in its Rancho Viejo L.L.C. v.
Norton27 decision (hereinafter Rancho Viejo), which involved private
development in an area inhabited by the intrastate arroyo toad.28 Here,
the D.C. Circuit focused on the commercial development as opposed to
the toad and enjoined the project, stating that the “regulated activity is
Rancho Viejo’s planned commercial development, not the arroyo toad
that it threatens.”29
Whether one applies GDF’s aggregated impacts approach or Rancho
Viejo’s restriction on commercial development, each holding appears to
stand in contradiction to Lopez’s emphasis that Congress cannot regulate
intrastate activities that do not have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.30 However, the Supreme Court may have bridged the gap
between these apparent inconsistencies with its recent decision in
Gonzales v. Raich.31 Raich involved California’s Compassionate Use
Act32 (hereinafter CUA), which authorized the use of marijuana for
medical purposes.33 Specifically at issue was whether the federal
Controlled Substances Act34 (hereinafter CSA), which Congress passed
using its Commerce Power, “includes the power to prohibit the local
cultivation and use of marijuana in compliance with California law.”35
Justice Stevens’ majority analysis sounded reminiscent of the Court’s
pre-Lopez jurisprudence. Here, the Court determined that the CSA was
within the Commerce Power and that Congress exercised “rational basis”
by including marijuana in Subsection 5 of the CSA. The majority noted
its 1971 Perez36 precedent, indicating that “[w]hen Congress decides that
the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it
24. Id. at 925-26.
25. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2898 (2005).
26. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 638 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 2898 (2005).
27. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004).
28. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1064; see also Mank, supra note 2, at 926.
29. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072.
30. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 595; (see also pp. 565 and 612)
31. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
32. Compassionate Use Act, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (2005).
33. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2196 (2005).
34. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2005).
35. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200.
36. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
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may regulate the entire class.”37
With the help of Perez, the Court was able to distinguish Raich from
Lopez and Morrison. In those decisions, explained Justice Stevens, the
Court struck down entire acts.38 The CSA was not at issue in Raich,
rather the issue involved the use of medical marijuana. Having
established that the CSA is a valid use of congressional power, the Court
“refuse[d] to excise individual components of that larger scheme.”39
In light of the majority’s logic in Raich, one could argue that the
outcomes in both GDF and Rancho Viejo now pass constitutional muster
because the respective species are part of an overall class of endangered
species. While this argument cannot be dismissed, neither can the fact
that Raich declined to overturn Lopez and Morrison. Given the
responsibility that society has to safeguard the environment and the
species that it supports, we must be cautious about basing this protection
on shaky constitutional ground. Perhaps, we should even consider other
constitutional solutions to resolve this national problem.
Part II of this comment outlines the facts, procedural posture, and
holdings surrounding both GDF and Rancho Viejo. Part III illustrates
how GDF and Rancho Viejo arguably exceed the scope of the Commerce
Clause under Lopez. By contrast, Part IV illustrates that the rationales in
both GDF and Rancho Viejo likely pass constitutional scrutiny under
Raich. Despite this fact, Part IV outlines concerns about protecting
species under the Raich approach. Part V asserts that GDF and Rancho
Viejo represent confusion and inconsistency in environmental and land
use jurisprudence. Such disarray is unfair to many groups and
undermines environmental efforts. Part VI suggests that Congress should
consider using alternative means such as its Spending Power when
regulating activities with attenuated connections to interstate commerce.
Part VII offers a brief conclusion.

37. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2206 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154-55).
38. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
39. Id. at 2209.
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II. GDF REALTY INVESTMENTS, LTD. V. NORTON AND RANCHO VIEJO
L.L.C. V. NORTON: FACTS AND HOLDINGS
A. GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton
1. The facts
Dr. Fred Purcell and his brother purchased a substantial interest in a
216-acre property near Austin, Texas in 1983.40 Six years later, the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter FWS) interrupted
the brothers’ development plans of installing water lines and other
utilities. The agency informed the Purcells that the planned development
might result in the taking41 of Cave Species in violation of Section 9 of
the ESA.42 The concern over a possible take had arisen one year earlier,
in 1988, when FWS listed as endangered five subterranean invertebrate
species.43 FWS listed a sixth species in 1993.44
The property is part of the Jollyville Plateau and features limestone
rock in which percolating water creates caves, sinkholes, and canyons.45
The caves serve as habitat for the Bee Creek Cave Harvestman, the Bone
Creek Harvestman, the Tooth Cave Pseudoscorpion, the Tooth Cave
Spider, the Tooth Cave Ground Beetle, and the Kretschmarr Cave Mold
Beetle.46 Each of the species is subterranean and four of the species are
eyeless.47 They range in size from 1.4 mm to 8 mm.48 These Cave
Species have no commercial value and are only found in underground
40. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2003).
41. The court defined a “take” with the following language:
Pursuant to § 9(a)(1) of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B), it is unlawful to “take” a
member of a species listed as endangered. ESA defines “take” as to “harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
Pursuant to authority given it by § 4(d) of ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d), FWS has defined
“harm” to include significant modifications or degradations of a habitat which kill or
injure protected wildlife “by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.
Id. at 625.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 624. FWS listed the species endangered pursuant to Section 4 of the ESA. See 16
U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1); see also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule To
Determine Five
Texas Cave Invertebrates To Be Endangered Species, 53 Fed. Reg. 36,029 (Sept. 16, 1988).
44. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Coffin Cave Mold Beetle
(Batrisodes texanus) and the Bone Cave Harvestman (Texella reyesi) Determined To Be
Endangered, 58 Fed. Reg. 43,818 (Aug. 18, 1993).
45. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 624.
46. Id. at 625.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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portions of Travis and Williamson Counties, Texas.49 The Cave Species,
however, are the subject of scientific interest, having had at least
fourteen scientific articles published about them by fifteen scientists.50
Some scientists visited Texas to study the species and the Cave Species
have been shipped to and from museums in New York, California,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Kentucky for study.51
Responding to the FWS notification that development would
probably constitute a take of the Cave Species, the Purcells deeded
approximately six acres of the property, which encompassed areas
known as Cave Species’ habitats, to Texas Systems of Natural
Laboratories, Inc., a non-profit organization. Following the
recommendation of Cave Species experts, the Purcells additionally
constructed gates covering the most ecologically sensitive caves.52
Tensions between FWS and the Purcells began escalating in 1991
when an agreement for the Purcells to sell the property fell apart because
FWS refused to accept the proposition that future development on the
property would not constitute a take.53 Just two years later, FWS initiated
a federal criminal investigation against Dr. Purcell for clearing brush on
his property, which might have amounted to an endangered species
take.54 The Purcells and their partners initiated action in federal court
seeking a declaratory judgment to state that developing their property
would not constitute an endangered species take.55
2. Procedural history
The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas
ordered FWS to conduct an environmental review.56 FWS summarized
its findings in a 1994 letter, which stated that the proposed development
would likely constitute an endangered species take.57 Not only did the
take involve the Cave Species, but FWS added two bird species as well.58
Because FWS failed to determine whether a take had indeed occurred,
the district court dismissed the criminal action in September of 1994.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
1993).
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see also Four Points Util. Joint Venture v. United States, No. 93-CV-665 (W.D. Tex.
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
Id. The two bird species were the golden-cheeked warbler and black-capped vireo.
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The Purcells once again attempted to convene construction plans in
1997 by applying for an incidental take permit.59 Rather than applying to
FWS, the Purcells tried their chances with the Balcones Canyonlands
Conversation Plan, a regional organization that grants incidental take
permits upon the payment of “mitigation fees.”60 The organization
rejected the application because the land fell completely within a
protected area.61 This rejection forced the Purcells to apply for an
incidental take permit through FWS.62 In responding to the application,
FWS decided that the preserves previously designated by the Purcells
could not adequately protect the endangered Cave Species.63 Tensions
again arose between FWS and the Purcells in July of 1998 when FWS
told the Purcells that it would not allow the incidental take permit, but
never issued the official denial.64 Thus, the Purcells could not challenge
the action, so, once again, the brothers filed suit in federal court.65 The
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas ruled that
FWS denied the permits de facto, prompting FWS to deny officially any
permits on the property.66 The district court upheld the determination
while admonishing FWS for refusing to issue a formal rejection.67
After failing twice in challenging FWS’s denials, the Purcell brothers
brought the instant action claiming that the regulation violated the
Commerce Clause as interpreted by United States v. Lopez.68 The third
time was not the charm; once again, the district court sided with FWS,
this time by holding that the take provision of the ESA is indeed
constitutional because the development substantially related to interstate
commerce.69 In explaining its decision, the court observed that, because
development plans included a Wal-Mart, it would be “hard-pressed to
find a more direct link to interstate commerce . . . .”70
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court’s determination that the ESA properly precluded GDF’s
development and did not exceed Commerce Clause powers as interpreted
59. Id. The Purcells applied for the permits pursuant to ESA § 10(a). See 16 U.S.C. §
1539(a). The GDF court explained that “[t]hese permits allow takes of endangered species under
certain circumstances, as listed in 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B).”
60. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also GDF Realty, Invs., Ltd. v. United States, No. 98-CV-772 (W.D. Tex. 1998).
67. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
68. Id.; see Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
69. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 627.
70. Id.
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by Lopez and Morrison. However, the Fifth Circuit rejected the lower
court’s reasoning, which it summarized as primarily considering
“plaintiffs’ commercial motivations that would underlie the takes.”71 The
appellate court reasoned that this analysis “would allow application of
otherwise unconstitutional statutes to commercial actors, but not to noncommercial actors. There would be no limit to Congress’ authority to
regulate intrastate activities, so long as those subjected to the regulation
were entities which had an otherwise substantial connection to interstate
commerce.”72 Rather, the court announced that the proper inquiry “is
primarily whether the expressly regulated activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, i.e., whether takes, be they of the Cave Species or
of all endangered species in the aggregate, have the substantial effect.”73
Operating within the framework of Lopez, the Fifth Circuit
recognized that the Cave Species have nothing to do with neither the
“channels” nor the “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce; rather, the
issue at bar was whether the Cave Species takes “substantially affect”
interstate commerce.74 Under Lopez, the first factor that courts must
decide under the “substantially affects” prong is whether the regulation is
economic in nature. The Fifth Circuit noted that, even if one considers
the connection between the Cave Species and “scientific travel or
publication industries[,]” the Cave Species’ impact on interstate
commerce is, at best, negligible.75 When the court could not find a
significant connection between the Cave Species and interstate
commerce, the Fifth Circuit looked to the ESA, which the court
determined was “economic in nature.”76 Looking at the Cave Species
within the context of the larger ESA protective scheme, the court noted
that allowing the taking of these Species would “undercut the ESA
scheme and lead to piece-meal extinctions.”77 The court reasoned that it
was essential to the ESA’s regulatory scheme to disallow this take;
otherwise, the ESA could not preclude future takes of this nature, and, if
aggregated, these takes would have a substantial effect on the ESA’s
regulation of interstate commerce.78
Having established that the taking of the Cave Species substantially
affects interstate economic activity because the Cave Species fall under
71. Id. at 633.
72. Id. at 634.
73. Id. at 633.
74. Id.; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
75. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 637.
76. Id. at 640.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 639. The court noted that under Lopez it is acceptable to use aggregation to uphold
regulated intrastate activities when it is an “‘essential’ part of the economic regulatory scheme.”
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the umbrella of the larger ESA protective scheme, the court next
addressed the fact that the ESA does not have an express jurisdictional
limit.79 The court held that Lopez did not preclude upholding the
regulation merely because of this deficiency: Although ESA does not
expressly provide a jurisdictional limit, it has an implicit limit because
“ESA’s take provision is limited to instances which ‘have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce.’”80
The court explained the third Lopez factor in connection with its
prior economic analysis: “ESA’s take provision is economic in nature
and supported by Congressional findings to that effect.”81 More
specifically, addressing the ESA’s legislative history that linked it to
interstate commerce, the court referred to the act’s “national scope” and
that its drafters concerned themselves with the “‘incalculable’ value of
the genetic heritage that might be lost absent regulation.”82
The Fifth Circuit concluded by noting that “the link between species
loss and a substantial commercial effect is not attenuated.”83
Furthermore, the court added that its decision does not overextend
federal authority because nothing in this holding “allow[s] Congress to
regulate general land use or wildlife preservation.”84
GDF Realty appealed the Fifth Circuit’s decision to the United States
Supreme Court, which denied certiorari in June 2005 in the wake of
Raich.85

79. Id. at 640; see also Lopez, 514 at 561.
80. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12
(2000)).
81. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640.
82. Id. at 639. The GDF court went on to quote the ESA Senate Report that explains the
congressional findings linking the ESA to interstate commerce:
From a pragmatic point of view, the protection of an endangered species of wildlife with
some commercial value may permit the regeneration of that species to a level where
controlled exploitation of that species can be resumed. In such a case, businessmen may
profit from the trading and marketing of that species for an indefinite number of years,
where otherwise it would have been completely eliminated from commercial channels in
a very brief span of time. Potentially more important, however, is the fact that with each
species we eliminate, we reduce the [genetic] pool . . . available for use by man in future
years. Since each living species and subspecies has developed in a unique way to adapt
itself to the difficulty of living in the world’s environment, as a species is lost, its
distinctive gene material, which may subsequently prove invaluable to mankind in
improving domestic animals or increasing resistance to disease or environmental
contaminants, is also irretrievably lost.
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-526 (1969)).
83. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640.
84. Id.
85. GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton, 125 S. Ct. 2898 (2005).
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B. Rancho Viejo L.L.C. v. Norton
1. The facts
Rancho Viejo, a home construction company, made plans to build a
280-home residential development located on 202 acres within San
Diego County.86 The property bordered Keys Creek on one side, which is
a tributary of the San Luis Rey River.87 The company dedicated a portion
of the property as a “borrow area” in order to excavate fill for the
housing project.88 The borrow area included parts of the Keys Creek
streambed in which the company intended to remove six or more feet of
soil.89
Under the Clean Water Act,90 Rancho Viejo needed to obtain a
permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter “the Corps”)
before engaging in the fill project. The Corps, however, denied the
permit because surveys confirmed that arroyo toads inhabited areas on,
and adjacent to, the excavation site.91 In denying the permit, the Corps
noted that “the project ‘may affect’ the arroyo toad population in the
area.”92
In an effort to further development, Rancho Viejo erected a fence
that ran parallel to Keys Creek.93 In addition to finding toads in their
breeding area in the creek, toads were later discovered on the upland side
of the fence as well.94 After the Corps had initially rejected the permit,
FWS reviewed the application pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA.95 In its
review of the application, FWS expressed the opinion that the fence
“‘has resulted in the illegal take and will result in the future illegal take
of federally endangered’ arroyo toads ‘in violation of the Endangered
Species Act.’”96 Later, FWS issued a formal Biological Opinion in which
it determined that the borrow area was “likely to jeopardize the

86. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2005). This provision provides that developers must obtain permits
when projects involve the discharge of fill into navigable waters.
91. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
92. Id. at 1065. After the United States Army Corps of Engineers rejected the permit, the Fish
and Wildlife Service reviewed the application pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (quoting a letter dated May 22, 2000 from the Fish and Wildlife Service explaining its
finding).
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continued existence” of the toads.97 FWS stated that Rancho Viejo could
complete the project if it would obtain the fill dirt off-site rather than
from the borrow area.98 Because it would cost Rancho Viejo millions of
dollars99 to excavate the fill off-site, the company decided to challenge
FWS’s determination.100
2. Procedural history
Rancho Viejo filed a complaint with the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia.101 In its complaint against the Secretary of
the Interior and other federal defendants, the company alleged that
FWS’s requirement that the company must obtain fill dirt off-site
exceeded the power of the federal government under the Commerce
Clause.102 The district court relied on its recent ruling, which upheld an
FWS finding in the face of a Commerce Clause challenge.103 In that case,
National Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt (NAHB),104 FWS halted
hospital construction because the agency believed that the development
would create the take of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly.105
Declaring the instant case indistinguishable from NAHB, the court
granted the government’s motion for summary judgment.106 In its
reasoning, the district court noted that no opinions from the Supreme
Court had cast doubt on NAHB subsequent to that ruling.107
After losing in district court, Rancho Viejo appealed to the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower court’s
ruling.108 The appellate court reasoned that the regulations imposed on
the development properly fit within the framework of Lopez’s four-part
substantial affects test for regulating intrastate activities under the
Commerce Clause.109
97. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
98. Id. The Fish and Wildlife Service made the compromise pursuant to ESA § 7(b)(3)(A)
and 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2003).
99. See Jack Kilpatrick, Note to Court: Sometimes a Toad Is Just a Toad, DESERET NEWS,
Dec. 26, 2003, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0%2C1249%2C575039061%2C00.html.
100. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1065.
101. Id. at 1066.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
105. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1066.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1068, 1080.
109. Id. at 1069-70; see also Mank, supra note 2, at 973; and United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 610-12 (2000) (in which Chief Justice Rehnquist paraphrased the four prongs limiting the
regulation of intrastate activities).

167]

INTRASTATE ENDANGERED SPECIES

179

Addressing the first Lopez factor, whether a regulation is economic
in nature, the D.C. Circuit relied on the district court’s NAHB holding.
The court stated:
[T]he construction of a hospital, power plant, and supporting
infrastructure [in NAHB] was plainly an economic enterprise. As . . .
[the NAHB court] observed, “the Department’s protection of the flies
regulates and substantially affects commercial development
activity. . . . The same is true here, where the regulated activity is the
construction of a 202-acre commercial housing development.”110

Next, the court analyzed the second Lopez factor: “whether the
statute in question contains an ‘express jurisdictional element.’”111 The
D.C. Circuit very candidly admitted that Section 9 of the ESA “has no
express jurisdictional hook that limits its application. . . .”112
Nevertheless, the Rancho Viejo court dismissed the problem reasoning
that “Lopez did not indicate that such a hook is required . . . .”113 The
court continued:
[The] absence [of a jurisdictional limit] did not dissuade the NAHB
court from finding application of the ESA constitutional. Nor did it
dissuade the Fourth Circuit from finding a similar application of the
ESA constitutional in Gibbs v. Babbit . . . .114 Indeed, all of the circuits
that have addressed the question since Lopez . . . have concluded that
the absence of an express jurisdictional element is not fatal to a
statute’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. Rather, in a case
like this, “the absence of such a jurisdictional element simply means
that courts must determine independently whether the statute regulates
activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial
transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce.”115

Lopez next requires the court to examine whether a statute has

110. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068.
111. Id. (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995)).
112. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068.
113. Id.
114. 214 F.3d 483, 487 (4th Cir. 2000).
115. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1068 (quoting United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,
1276 (11th Cir. 1999) (which held that the lack of a jurisdictional element does not preclude
regulation of intrastate activities); see also Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2002);
Groome Res. Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 211 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bird,
124 F.3d 667, 675 (5th Cir. 1997).
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congressional findings linking the substantial effect to interstate
commerce.116 Again, the court admitted deficiency with this prong
because there were no specific findings or history with respect to “the
effect of commercial housing construction on interstate commerce.”117
The D.C. Circuit looked to the language of Lopez to overcome this
deficit and cited the statement that “Congress normally is not required to
make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce.”118 The court further observed that “such evidence
merely ‘enables [the court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the
activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even
though no such substantial effect was visible to the naked eye.’”119 The
D.C. Circuit concluded that this case did not merit scrutiny beyond the
naked eye because there were general “express findings and legislative
history indicating that Congress enacted the ESA out of concern that land
development and habitat modification were leading to species extinction
and had to be controlled by federal legislation.”120
Just as Rancho Viejo failed to convince the D.C. Circuit on the first
three Lopez prongs, the company struck out on the fourth and final Lopez
factor: whether the relationship between the statute and interstate
commerce is too attenuated.121 The fatal blow to the company was its
inability to show that this project did not have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.122 After holding that the relationship between the
Rancho Viejo construction and interstate commerce is not too attenuated;
the D.C. Circuit declared that the relationship between interstate
commerce and the arroyo toad would have been too attenuated by itself
to survive this prong of the Lopez test.123 Though the court did not
specifically cite to GDF, it stated in a footnote that it did not “mean to
discredit rationales that other circuits have relied upon in upholding
endangered species legislation.”124
After losses in both the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia and the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals,
Rancho Viejo appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.125
116. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62.
117. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069.
118. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562); accord United States. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
612 (2000).
119. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563); accord Morrison, 529
U.S. at 612.
120. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069. See infra Part III.B.
121. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-67; accord Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
122. Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1067, n.2; see also Mank, supra note 2, at 926.
125. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 540 U.S. 1218 (2004); see also Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v.
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III. BASING ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION ON THE RESPECTIVE
RATIONALES IN GDF AND RANCHO VIEJO MAY PROVE INADEQUATE
UNDER LOPEZ
Most reasonable people recognize that GDF and Rancho Viejo hit on
the important truth that society needs to protect endangered species and
their habitats.126 The problem with these circuit court opinions is that
their reliance on the Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate activities
stands on shaky constitutional ground. Raich bolsters these opinions;
however, Raich did not overturn Lopez. Whether the Roberts’ Court
favors the Lopez or the Raich line of reasoning remains unknown.
Because it is unknown which direction the transitioning Roberts’
Court will follow in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is instructive
to analyze the weaknesses from which both GDF and Rancho Viejo
suffer under the Lopez analysis. A careful evaluation of the four Lopez
intrastate factors shows significant vulnerabilities.
A. Rancho Viejo’s Vulnerabilities under Lopez
Interestingly, the GDF court highlighted Rancho Viejo’s
susceptibility under the first Lopez prong, which requires courts to
determine whether the regulated activity is economic in nature.127 GDF
undermined Rancho Viejo’s analysis when it rejected the Texas district
court’s determination that it could regulate the commercial activity
threatening the Cave Species. Of course, the Texas district court’s
reasoning was identical to the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Rancho Viejo.
In rejecting this rationale, the GDF court noted that this logic “would
allow application of otherwise unconstitutional statutes to commercial
actors, but not to non-commercial actors. There would be no limit to
Congress’ authority to regulate intrastate activities, so long as those
Norton, 541 U.S. 1006 (2004).
126. Because I had the privilege of growing up in Idaho near some of the nation’s most
treasured and pristine wilderness areas and national parks, there are few more adamant about
protecting the environment and endangered species than me. The ESA is of vital importance to the
protection of both wildlife and the environment. The arguments presented in this paper are not
intended to undermine the ESA as originally enacted and as it has been amended. Despite my
support for the ESA, I argue that the statute may not protect intrastate noncommercial species
adequately because of constitutional concerns outlined in this analysis. Indeed, the statute is
currently under attack because of these concerns. See Christopher Getzan, Controversial Attack on
Endangered Species Act May Backfire, THE NEW STANDARD, July 12, 2005, available at:
http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=show_item&itemid=2078. The intent of this paper is to
present an honest analysis about this difficult situation and encourage thoughtful debate regarding
how we can best meet our responsibility to the environment.
127. Id. at 559.
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subjected to the regulation were entities which had an otherwise
substantial connection to interstate commerce.”128 Whether the Court
adopts this same philosophy in a future challenge remains unknown.
However, if the Court does support this argument, Rancho Viejo’s logic
will likely fall outside of Lopez’s emphasis that an intrastate activity
must be economic in nature. If this were to occur, the final three prongs
would almost certainly fall as well.
Rancho Viejo frankly admitted that ESA lacked the second Lopez
factor, whether the statute contains an express jurisdictional limit. The
D.C. Circuit dismissed this problem stating that “Lopez did not indicate
that such a hook is required . . . .”129 The court further remarked, “all of
the circuits that have addressed the question since Lopez . . . have
concluded that the absence of an express jurisdictional element is not
fatal to a statute’s constitutionality under the Commerce Clause.”130
Given the weight of the precedent cited by the Rancho Viejo court, there
is little reason to doubt that the absence of a jurisdictional limit should be
fatal to a statute. The problem, however, with the D.C. Circuit’s analysis
is the potential deficiencies the decision encounters with the other three
prongs.
Just as there were no jurisdictional limits, there were no
congressional findings linking the endangered specie takes to interstate
commerce. Regarding the congressional findings prong, the D.C. Circuit
openly confessed the insufficiency of the congressional findings only to
subsequently dismiss this issue as insubstantial. Because there were no
legislative findings supporting the court’s premise, it quoted the
following line from Lopez: “Congress normally is not required to make
formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity has on
interstate commerce.”131 Just as one could disregard deficiencies dealing
with the second prong, one could easily apply the same deferential
analysis to this Lopez factor. However, in light of the questionable
rationale classifying this activity as economic in nature and having no
jurisdictional limits, this undifferentiated deference could easily be
overturned in future challenges.
In looking at the final Lopez factor, whether the connection to
interstate commerce is too attenuated, the Rancho Viejo court simply
stated that its holding was not too attenuated because of Rancho Viejo
L.L.C.’s inability to show that its project did not have a substantial effect
128. GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634 (5th Cir. 2003).
129. Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1069 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995)); accord United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000)).
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on interstate commerce.132 If a future Supreme Court adopts the GDF
argument that cases exercising Rancho Viejo’s logic do not qualify as
economic in nature, the D.C. Circuit’s argument that the company would
have to show that the project is not too attenuated may prove inadequate.
B. GDF’s Vulnerabilities under Lopez
In determining whether the regulation was economic in nature, GDF
arguably fared better than Rancho Viejo because its decision is grounded
in established constitutional precedent. The Fifth Circuit believed that it
was obligated to disallow the take of the Cave Species in order to
preserve the integrity of the ESA.133 Adopting analysis similar to the
famous 1942 Supreme Court case Wickard v. Filburn,134 the Fifth Circuit
noted that future takes of this nature, if aggregated, would have a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.135
In the same manner that GDF arguably enjoys the upper hand over
Rancho Viejo on the first prong, the Fifth Circuit’s reliance on Wickard
could help establish the validity of the remaining prongs under Lopez. In
each factor, the court has the ability to invoke Wickard’s aggregate
effects doctrine. Indeed, under this doctrine, the court easily explained
how it remained within jurisdictional limits despite the ESA lacking the
specific language. The court accomplished the task by arguing that there
was an implicit jurisdictional limit.136 GDF explained that the “take
provision is limited to instances which ‘have an explicit connection with
or effect on interstate commerce.’”137 Under the aggregated approach, the
explicit connection to interstate commerce is arguably clearer. The same
is true with the congressional findings prong. Here, the court simply
needed to state that “ESA’s take provision is economic in nature and
supported by Congressional findings to that effect.”138 Finally, the
regulation does not seem too attenuated using this logic, which has been
established constitutional law since 1942.
While Wickard offers constitutional credence to GDF’s approach,
GDF is not free from Lopez. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Lopez,
articulated the most serious susceptibility in this line of reasoning:
“Wickard . . . is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1069.
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639-40.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639-40.
Id. at 624.
Id. (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000)).
GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 640.
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Clause authority over intrastate activity.”139 Some commentators have
even suggested that Lopez intended to limit Wickard.140 For example, one
analysis argued that substantial discrepancy existed between the two
cases. The commentator argued that “[r]ather than confronting this
language, the Lopez majority insisted that the facts of Wickard,
concerning wheat production, supported the notion that Congress could
reach only economic activity. By recasting Wickard in this manner, the
Court began to dismantle the core of the post-1937 revolution in
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.”141 Another commentator echoed these
concerns in stating that “Lopez’s treatment of Wickard was meant to
limit the aggregation principle to statutes that regulate economic
activity.”142
The Rehnquist Court’s Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County
v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers143 (hereinafter SWANCC) decision
suggests that concerns regarding Lopez limiting Wickard are not without
merit. In SWANCC, the Corps, under the 1972 Federal Water Pollution
Control Act,144 asserted jurisdiction over an abandoned gravel and sand
pit when migratory birds were spotted in the area.145 The Court had two
issues before it. First, the Court decided whether the Corps could
properly exert statutory authority over the waters.146 Second, the Court
heard the issue of whether the authority was proper under the Commerce
Clause.147 The Court decided the case against the Corps on narrow
statutory grounds.148 Even though the SWANCC court declined to rule on
the constitutional issue, it said in dicta: “federal jurisdiction over ponds
and mudflats falling within the Migratory Bird Rule would significantly
impinge upon the State’s traditional and primary power over land and
water use.”149 SWANCC’s impact on intrastate environmental regulation
in cases such as GDF remains unknown. However, this dicta shows that
GDF could be just as vulnerable as Rancho Viejo.
The Rancho Viejo court exposed another susceptibility of GDF.
139. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
140. Robert A. Schpiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and
Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1222 (2003).
141. See Schpiro and Buzbee, supra note 140 at 1222.
142. Alex Kreit, Why is Congress Still Regulating Noncommercial Activity?, 28 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 169, 174 (2004).
143. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
144. See generally Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
145. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S.
159, 162 (2001).
146. SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 162.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 174.
149. Id.
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Rancho Viejo made a conscious decision to uphold the regulation on the
activity infringing on the species rather than the species themselves.150
The court then, in a footnote, implicitly referred to GDF and noted that it
did not “mean to discredit rationales that other circuits have relied upon
in upholding endangered species legislation.”151 Rancho Viejo was
sincere in not wanting to undermine the mode in which GDF established
the economic nature of the activity; however, the court recognized the
inconsistency and declined to follow its analysis. Certainly, the D.C.
Circuit is under no obligation to follow the Fifth Circuit. However, just
as the D.C. Circuit does not have to follow GDF’s reasoning, the
Supreme Court is also free to depart from its precedent and follow Lopez
more closely. In fact, then Judge Roberts, now Chief Justice Roberts,
wrote on this very issue that the discrepancies between the circuits
“afford the opportunity to consider alternative grounds for sustaining the
application of the Act that may be more consistent with Supreme Court
precedent.”152 The bottom line is that we cannot be certain that just
because GDF faithfully applied Wickard, future Supreme Court cases
will do the same.
IV. RAICH’S RATIONAL COULD SUSTAIN THE RESPECTIVE REASONING
IN BOTH RANCHO VIEJO AND GDF IF THE COURT IS WILLING TO
DISREGARD LOPEZ
If the Roberts’ Court chooses to adhere more closely to the Court’s
recent Raich holding, the rationales in both GDF and Rancho Viejo will
likely meet little resistance in future challenges of a similar nature.
Justice Stevens’ majority opinion articulated two vital concepts that
should shield the circuit courts’ rationales. First, the Court seemed to
adopt a rational basis standard reminiscent of pre-Lopez Commerce
Clause jurisprudence. For example, the Court reasoned: “Congress had a
rational basis for concluding that leaving home-consumed marijuana
outside federal control would similarly affect price and market
conditions.”153 Even though this individual component of the CSA may
not pass the Lopez factors by itself, the Court still decided that it would
defer to Congress.
The second concept that would uphold GDF and Rancho Viejo is the

150. Rancho Viejo L.L.C. v Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
151. Id. at 1067 n.2; see also Mank, supra note 2, at 926.
152. Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Rancho Viejo was decided by a
panel of D.C. Circuit judges and Judge Roberts is dissenting from a denial of an appeal to hear the
case en banc in this passage.
153. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209 (2005).
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Court’s repeated statements indicating that “where the class of activities
is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal power, the courts
have no power ‘to excise, as trivial, individual instances’ of the class.”154
In another passage, Justice Stevens wrote:
Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely
local activities that are part of an economic “class of activities” that
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. As we stated in
Wickard, “even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on intestate
commerce.” We have never required Congress to legislate with
scientific exactitude. When congress decides that the ‘total incidence’
of practice poses a threat to a national market, it may regulate the entire
class. In this vein, we have reiterated that when a general regulatory
statue bears, a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis
character of individual instances arising under that statue is of no
consequence.155

The Cave Species and the arroyo toads contribute to the overall
biodiversity and likely qualify as “individual instances” of an overall
class. Following this logic, Justice Steven’s language above likely
protects these species.
While little argument exists that the Court would sustain either GDF
or Rancho Viejo under a strict application of Raich, the question remains
whether the Court is willing to move beyond Lopez.156 This question of
where the Court’s loyalty lies could be answered in short order because it
recently granted certiorari on an issue that may force it to address the
discrepancies between Raich and Lopez. Rapanos v. United States,157
along with two companion cases,158 addresses “[w]hether application of
the Clean Water Act to the wetlands at issue in this case is a permissible
exercise of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”159 The
issue in Raponos is substantially the same as in GDF and Rancho Viejo

154. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2209.
155. Id. at 2205-2206.
156. Lauren K. Saunders, a passionate advocate for expanded congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause expressed the view that “Raich may prove to be an isolated case.” See Lauren K.
Saunders, The Judicial Threat to Congressional Power, NSCLC at 7, July 19, 2005, available online
at: http://www.watchingjustice.org/pub/doc_697/kelo_congressproc.pdf.
157. Rapanos v. United States, No. 04-1034 (2005).
158. See Carabell v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 04-1384 (2005); S.D. Warren Co. v. ME Bd of
Envtl Prot, 04-1527 (2005).
159. Brief of the Respondent at I, Rapanos v. United States, No. 04-1034 (April 4, 2005).
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with perhaps two differences. First, Raponos will examine the issue
within the context of the Clean Water Act as opposed to the ESA.
Second, the United States is arguing that the issue involves the channels
and instrumentalities prong of interstate commerce rather than the
“substantially effects” prong.160
The arguments surrounding Raponos reveal that Raich does not yet
firmly control intrastate environmental issues. For example, one of the
petitioner’s contentions highlights the tension between Raich and Lopez.
The argument embraces one of the central tenants of the Rehnquist
federalism revolution, namely, the idea that the allowance of the
regulation would “completely obliterate the Constitution’s distinction
between national and local authority.”161 Raich’s rational basis standard,
along with its refusal to excise individual instances of a class, would
likely dismiss the concern expressed by the petitioners in Raponos. On
the other hand, a court concerned with federalism might agree with
Raponos’ assertion. A significant argument exists that if Congress can
regulate intrastate species with no known commercial value such as the
Cave Species and the arroyo toad, Congress could arguably regulate
most activities.
The United States’ Brief in Opposition of the Petitioner counters the
argument listed above with the same logic demonstrated in Raich.
Namely, that Congress only needs a rational basis in concluding that the
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.162 The outcome in
Raponos very well could vindicate regulating intrastate, noncommercial
environmental interests with the Commerce Clause. In the meantime, the
Raponos controversy illustrates the substantial risk in using the
Commerce Clause to regulate intrastate, non-commercial activities.
V. EVEN IF DETERMINED CONSTITUTIONAL, THE GDF AND RANCHO
VIEJO DECISIONS UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO PROTECT ENDANGERED
SPECIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
A. GDF and Rancho Viejo’s Respective Lines of Reasoning Offer
Inadequate Safeguards in Protecting Endangered Species
The motivation behind this comment is to promote the protection of
as many endangered species as possible, including the Cave Species and
the arroyo toad. Even if we could never find any commercial value for
the Cave Species, for example, I believe that we have an obligation to
160. Brief of the Respondent, supra note 159, at 23.
161. Id. at 24.
162. Id. at 23-24.
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protect our planet and its resources. It is precisely because of our duty to
take care of our natural resources that it is unwise to follow the reasoning
of either GDF or Rancho Viejo. Even though these decisions appear to
fulfill this objective, their reasoning is shortsighted and tenuous.
Rancho Viejo’s deficiency in protecting endangered species is
apparent and has rightly been the subject of criticism by many
commentators; indeed, even the concurring opinion in Rancho Viejo
recognized the court’s failure.163 Chief Justice Ginsberg of the D.C.
Circuit Court eloquently articulated the problem:
Our rationale is that, with respect to a species that is not an article in
interstate commerce and does not affect interstate commerce, a take can
be regulated if—but only if—the take itself substantially affects
interstate commerce. The large-scale residential development that is the
take in this case clearly does affect interstate commerce. Just as
important, however, the lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner
who moves dirt in order to landscape his property, though he takes the
toad, does not affect commerce.164

With each of us belonging to a society with the responsibility of
protecting these species, the Rancho Viejo precedent should alarm us.
Simply stated, the rationale exposes endangered species to exploitation
and extinction as long as there is no “commercial activity” behind the
take.
The pitfall with GDF’s logic is much more nuanced and discrete than
what we see in Rancho Viejo; nevertheless, the court managed to expose
the Cave Species to danger by relying on a Senate report that focuses on
species with “some commercial value” and that allows exploitation once
a species regenerates.165 Under this rationale, if the Purcell brothers were
to show that the species are not commercial, or that their efforts to

163. See Mank, supra note 2, at 926-927. Professor Mank echoed the language of Chief
Justice Ginsberg’s concurrence when he observed the following:
If a court focuses on the ESA’s means in regulating the economic impact of the activities
that harm endangered species, then the government likely can regulate large scale
construction projects, but not a lone hiker walking through a forest or perhaps even
individual homeowners, although in the aggregate both types of activities could cause
significant harm to these species.
164. Rancho Viejo v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Ginsburg, C.J.,
concurring). See also Mank, supra note 2, at 923 n.20. Professor Mank noted that “[t]he majority
opinion in Viejo suggested that the lone hiker might be subsumed within the statute’s broader
purposes, but declined to answer the question because the facts of the case involved a substantial
commercial housing development and not a lone hiker.” See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1077-78.
165. GDF Realty v.Norton , 326 F.3d 622, 639 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-526
(1969)).
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preserve the Cave Species166would result in the rejuvenation of the
Species, then they might begin exploiting the Cave Species to some
extent. The bottom line is that the Senate report on which the court relies
does not sufficiently explain when the ESA protects a given species.
Alarmingly, its primary guide appears to address when business interests
may exploit creatures with “some commercial value” after
“rejuvenation”.167
B. Holdings Such as GDF and Rancho Viejo Erode Support for
Environmental Regulations and Unnecessarily Pit Various Groups
against Each Other
The respective rationales in GDF and Rancho Viejo create
unnecessary tension between environmentalists and other groups such as
private property owners and policy makers.168 Given the experiences of
the plaintiffs in GDF and Rancho Viejo, one can easily understand why
tensions might escalate. For GDF Realty, not only were the owners
deprived of the option of developing or selling their land, but they also
received notice of criminal charges for clearing brush on their own
property.169 These criminal charges came after voluntarily deeding six
acres of the property to a conservation group and constructing protective
fences for the benefit of the Cave Species.170
In fairness, if GDF Reality had notice that clearing brush on its
property amounted to a take, the criminal charges do not seem so
extreme. Nevertheless, leveling charges of this nature arguably has the
effect of exponentially increasing tensions while decreasing the incentive
various groups have to work with each other to reach a solution that is
best for the environment. A perfect example of this phenomenon is
occurring in connection with the Supreme Court granting certiorari in
Raponos. Mr. Raponos has gained enormous sympathy and galvanized
people on every side of the issue because of the potential prison sentence
166. Recall that the Purcell brothers deeded the most sensitive portions of the property to a
conservation group and subsequently gated the areas in order to further protect the Cave Species. See
supra Part II.A.1.
167. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 639 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-526 (1969)).
Perhaps the redeeming quality of the Senate Report is the fact that it also addresses the
importance of protecting ecosystems. My hope is that protecting ecosystems, as opposed
to dictating when businesses may exploit the creatures, is the primary purpose behind the
Senate Report. If this is the primary purpose behind the Senate Report, my argument that
the legislative language on which GDF relies exposes the creatures to danger fails. This
is one argument in which I hope I am incorrect.
168. See Blumm & Kimbrell, supra note 7.
169. GDF Realty, 326 F.3d at 626.
170. Id. at 625.
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he faces for filling in wetland areas on his property.171
The situation for Rancho Viejo was undoubtedly just as frustrating.
The company constructed a fence hoping to protect the arroyo toad after
the Corps denied a permit for Rancho Viejo to obtain fill from its own
property.172 FWS responded to the company’s effort to protect the toads
with a Biological Opinion that the fence was the source of present and
future illegal takes.173 The only way that Rancho Viejo L.L.C. could
precede with its project is if it obtained fill off-site, which would have
cost several million dollars.174 FWS should not be unduly criticized for
denying the permit nor for issuing the unfavorable biological opinion
regarding the fence. The agency was undoubtedly executing its duty in a
faithful manner. However, this case, similar to GDF and Raponos,
illustrates the extremely polarizing regulatory scheme in place under the
Commerce Clause. Rather than working for the good of the environment,
groups form every side seem to focus more on why they are correct in
supporting/not supporting the use of the Commerce Clause. Rather than
fostering respect for the environment and encouraging its preservation,
we are creating opponents of preservation.
VI. CONGRESS’ SPENDING POWERS: A POSSIBLE COMPROMISE AND
SOLUTION
Having illustrated some of the problems in basing the protection of
intrastate noncommercial species on the Interstate Commerce Clause,
this article now addresses a possible solution. The heart of the
controversy surrounding the ESA boils down to the tension between
federalism and private property rights versus the federal government’s
desire to protect endangered species. Congress’ Spending Powers
represent a particularly intriguing alternative to address this tension.
In the landmark 1987 South Dakota v. Dole175 (hereinafter Dole)
decision, the Court articulated a five-pronged analysis for the spending
powers that, if followed, could substantially resolve the dilemma
presented in regulating noncommercial intrastate species. Dole involved
the question of whether Congress exceeded its spending powers by
171. See David Stout, Justices Take Case Disputing U.S. Power Over Private Wetlands, N.Y.
TIMES, October 11, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/11/politics/10cnd-scotus.
html?ex=1130126400&en=1bfdf76ab1ec63c8&ei=5070&hp&ex=11290896.
172. Rancho Viejo L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
173. Id. (quoting a letter dated May 22, 2000 from the Fish and Wildlife Service explaining its
finding).
174. See Jack Kilpatrick, Note to Court: Sometimes a Toad Is Just a Toad, DESERET NEWS,
Dec. 26, 2003, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0%2C124%2C575039061%2C00.html.
175. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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conditioning federal highway funds on states adopting a uniform
minimum drinking age.176 In deciding that the highway grant condition
did not exceed Congress’ spending powers, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, first examined whether Congress exercised the
spending power for the general welfare.177 Next, the Court looked at
whether Congress provided the states with an unambiguous option of
whether they would comply.178 The third prong that the Court concerned
itself with was whether the grant related to a federal interest.179 Fourth,
the Court required that Congress could not use its spending powers
inconsistently with other constitutional provisions such as the Tenth
Amendment or the Bill of Rights.180 Finally, the Court declared that the
penalty must not be too severe or coercive for non-complying states.181
Applying the Dole framework to the regulation of intrastate
noncommercial species arguably resolves the conflict between
federalism and the national goal of protecting all endangered species.
Dole allows room for Congress to influence and regulate purely intrastate
activity such as a housing development infringing upon the arroyo toads;
yet Dole’s analysis still respects a state’s right to pursue its own
environmental policy.
Dole’s first prong, which allows Congress to use its spending powers
for the general welfare, shows how the Spending Power can be used to
regulate intrastate activity such as development causing potential harm to
the Cave Species and arroyo toads. Under this prong, Congress should
have little problem declaring that it is providing for the general welfare
by protecting these species. From an environmental prospective,
Congress simply needs to argue that preserving individual ecosystems
contributes to human health and helps strengthen our natural resources.
Congress could also explain that the decision to protect these species
contributes to the nation’s general welfare because of the positive
applications for science.
Despite the strong possibility that some groups will question the link
between intrastate noncommercial species and the nation’s general
welfare, environmental proponents have little to fear from this Dole
prong. The primary reason why this prong is advantageous for
conservationalists is that it is arguably easier to justify protecting
noncommercial intrastate species under a general welfare scheme, as

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

, Id. at 205.
Id. at 206-207.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 211.
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opposed to an interstate commerce analysis. Clearly, there is a strong
link between a healthy ecosystem and our nation’s general welfare. By
contrast, the very fact that the D.C. and Fifth circuits could not agree
regarding the relationship of the endangered species to interstate
commerce shows that this link is not as strong as the general welfare
connection.
Having examined Dole’s first prong, which arguably satisfies
environmental proponents’ desire to protect these species on a federal
level, it is important to review Dole’s other prongs, which help to
preserve federalism. These prongs require Congress to uphold the Tenth
Amendment and provide states with an unambiguous option of whether
they will comply with the regulation. Additionally, these Dole provisions
ensure that Congress does not punish states in unrelated areas nor levy
unduly severe penalties for not complying. Dole concluded that Congress
was not acting coercively in denying five percent of South Dakota’s
highway funds for noncompliance.182 If Congress were to apply a five
percent penalty to a related interest for allowing the takes of intrastate
noncommercial endangered species, it would eliminate the “race to the
bottom”183 problem of not regulating. At the same time, states would still
maintain ultimate control.
Like any other regulatory scheme, Dole likely suffers from some
flaws; however, one commentator articulately framed the argument for
considering this approach:
[T]he problem arises in the application of such broad statutes to
problems of tangential connection to interstate commerce, such as
isolated wetlands and isolated species, where no overt or substantial
effect on interstate commerce is discernible. By making almost all of
the environmental statutes dependent on one clause, albeit a broad
clause of the Constitution, Congress has placed at risk many
environmental statutes. If the Commerce Clause applies, then the
Spending Clause is superfluous. If, however, the Commerce Clause
does not encompass such environmentally sensitive matters as isolated
wetlands or species, then Congress may still accomplish these goals by
attaching conditions to federal funds.184

182. Id.
183. The term “race to the bottom” is an economic term that refers to the phenomenon that
rational actors will negatively exploit their own resources to compete with another economic actor.
In a context such as endangered species, a race to the bottom scenario would occur if no regulations
existed and two states allowed businesses to negatively exploit creatures in return for the tax dollars
that those businesses would generate.
184. Denis Binder, Spending Clause Symposium: The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of
Environmental Protection, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 162 (Spring 2001).
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Clearly, this alternative merits further consideration and could prove
successful in forging a compromise between advocates of both
federalism and endangered species.
VII. CONCLUSION
Society has the responsibility to protect the environment and the
endangered species that it supports. The ESA has been, and hopefully
will continue to be an important tool in fulfilling this paramount
responsibility. Despite the ESA’s success, substantial controversy
surrounds its application to intrastate noncommercial species. Sadly,
frustration from decisions like GDF and Rancho Viejo has created
significant opposition to the entire provision. Indeed, a recent draft of a
congressional bill proposed scaling back ESA provisions and eventually
sunsetting the Act by 2015.185 Rather than scrapping the entire ESA, I
believe that a compromise such as using Congress’ Spending Power
would be in everybody’s best interest.186 Of course, conflict is
unavoidable and we can never reach a Utopia where everyone will be
happy and there are only winners. As a society, we must make difficult
decisions that will inevitably affect some adversely. Nevertheless, there
is no reason why we cannot find a better way to address this problem.
Hopefully, the controversy surrounding GDF and Rancho Viejo will have
the positive effect of forcing an open, honest discussion about how best
to fulfill our duty to protect our planet and all of its species.
Paul Ziel*

185. See Christopher Getzan, Controversial Attack on Endangered Species Act May Backfire,
THE NEW STANDARD, July 12, 2005, available at: http://newstandardnews.net/content/?action=
show_item&itemid=2078.
186. While I believe that the Spending Powers represent the most promising compromise, I
think that other viable options exist such as the Treaty Powers. This, and other options, should be
considered as well.
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